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I.

INTRODUCTION

The United States Constitution employs the concept of "separation of powers" in order to prevent the accumulation of excessive power
within a single branch of government.1 As the Supreme Court observed
in Immigration and NaturalizationService v. Chadha,2 "[tihe Constitution sought to divide the delegated powers of the new Federal Government into three defined categories, Legislative, Executive, and Judicial, to assure, as nearly as possible, that each Branch of government
would confine itself to its assigned responsibility." '3 Because the Consti* Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Akron, A.B., Harvard University,
1980; M.Sc., University of Bristol (England), 1981; J.D., University of Tennessee, 1984; Ph.D.,
University of Connecticut, 1988.
1. According to James Madison, one of the authors of the Constitution and a central figure
in the process of designing the American national government, "[t]he accumulation of all powers,
legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and
whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of

tyranny."
2.
3.

THE FEDERALIST

No. 47

(JAMES MADISON).

Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
Id. at 951.
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tution grants to Congress the exclusive power to raise revenue and en-

act spending programs," an inevitable consequence of the governing
system's division of authority is that all of the branches of government
are dependent upon the legislative branch for the allocation of re-

sources and the creation of institutional structures and programs. In
the federal system, for example, only the U.S. Supreme Court was established by Article III of the Constitution.6 Congress shapes the or-

ganization and authority of other components of the judicial branch
because, according to the Constitution, lower courts are the "inferior
courts [that] the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." 6 Thus federal judicial officers must attempt to persuade or influence Congress in order to gain sufficient resources and to insure that
court organization and procedures fulfill judicial actors' needs and
expectations.
How do judicial officers attempt to influence the legislative
branch? What are the consequences of judicial officers' political tactics
aimed at shaping legislative actions that affect the courts? Because of
the secrecy that shrouds activities 'behind the purple curtain' of the
judiciary, it can be difficult for outsiders to assess the nature and results of judicial lobbying. 7 The limited research on this topic has focused primarily upon federal judges. 8 For example, interviews with
judges and government officials have provided insights on federal appellate judges' strategic activities that affected the congressional decision
4. For example, the Constitution's discussion of congressional power includes the following:
"The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes." U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl.1; "The
Congress shall have power . . . to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying
into execution [the subjects under legislative authority]." U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl.18; "No
money shall be drawn from the treasury, but in consequence of appropriations made by law." U.S.
7.
CONST., art. I, § 9, cl.
5. "The judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court ....
U.S. CONST., art. III, § 1.
6. Id.
7. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATES IN THE FEDERAL
COURTS: SUBORDINATE JUDGES 9 (1990).
Because their legitimacy within the American governing system is dependent upon the
maintenance of the judicial myth that judges act without political motivations by adhering to neutral principles of law, judges have a great incentive to protect their discretionary actions from external scrutiny and evaluation. Opportunities for observation of
the behind-the-scenes behavior and interactions of judicial officers are relatively rare.
8. See, e.g., PETER G. FISH, THE POLITICS OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 301-05
(1973) (Judicial Conference of the United States serves as legislative liaison for the federal judiciary's communications to Congress.).
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to divide the old Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals into two circuits.' That
study, however, has been criticized for failing to analyze judicial lobbying "in particular depth [and] with . . . attention given to problems

such lobbying can entail."10 Thus, much remains to be learned about
judicial officers' tactics in seeking to influence legislative enactments.

Appointees to Article III judgeships tend to have close connections

to members of Congress and leaders within political parties:
If politics enlarges the career opportunities of American lawyers, so it
restricts eligibility for high judicial office. Judgeships normally are rewards for political service. As a distinguished federal judge observed:
"You can't get on the federal bench in this country without a political
claim. I had a political claim, and so did every one of my
colleagues."' 1
Unlike the Article III judges who possess "well-developed relationships
with one or more legislators . . . [because they] were active politically

prior to assuming a position on the federal bench,"' 2 other judicial actors do not possess such advantages for lobbying legislators.13 The
United States magistrate judges,1 4 for example, receive their appointments as subordinate judicial officers from district judges rather than
from connections to political parties, members of Congress, and the
9.

See

DEBORAH

J. BARROW &

THOMAS

G. WALKER, A

COURT DIVIDED: THE FIFTH CIR-

CUIT COURT OF APPEALS AND THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL REFORM

10.
11.
(1981).

12.

Stephen L. Wasby, A Rich Historical Account, 72

(1988).

JUDICATURE

306, 307 (1989).

J. WOODFORD HOWARD, COURTS OF APPEALS IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 90

BARROW & WALKER, supra note 9, at 260.
13. Because United States senators are so deeply involved in the process of selecting federal
judges, aspiring judges frequently need to demonstrate close connections with, and loyal service to,
the political party of both the President and a senator from the jurisdiction which has the judicial
vacancy.
On the occasion of a vacancy on a federal district court, the attorney general, usually
through his deputy attorney general, undertakes a search for possible nominees. At this
early stage, the senators of the president's party are usually brought into the process.
They may have their own nominee or slate of nominees, or they may elect at this point
to reserve judgment, preferring to react to the deputy attorney general's nominees. In
any case, [the senators'] role is crucial, some say determinative. Through the custom of
senatorial courtesy, the relevant senators may exercise a virtual veto over the president's choice.
HARRY P. STUMPF, AMERICAN JUDICIAL POLITICS 192 (1988).
14. The Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990)
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § I (Supp. 1991)), changed the subordinate judicial officers' title to
"United States magistrate judge." In order to set the stage for a discussion of the new title, this
article will use the old title, "United States magistrate," in discussing the history and development
of the judicial office prior to the passage of the 1990 Act.
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President. 5 Full-time magistrates are appointed to eight-year renewable terms in office by the district judges for whom they will work. 16
Because the office of magistrate judge has evolved rapidly during the

two decades since its creation1 7 and because magistrate judges' precise
roles were not clearly defined by Congress," these subordinate judicial
15. Prior to statutory revisions in 1979, U.S. magistrates were appointed directly by the
district judges for whom they would work. As a result, many of the first magistrates were relatively inexperienced former law clerks who gained a new title and term in office, but who continued to work for district judges in a law clerk-like capacity. Christopher E. Smith, Who Are the
U.S. Magistrates?, 71 JUDICATURE 143, 145 (1987). After 1979, magistrates were appointed and

reappointed through a "merit selection process" in which citizens committees solicit applications
and make recommendations to the district judges about the most qualified candidates for appointment. See Christopher E. Smith, Merit Selection Committees and the Politics of Appointing
United States Magistrates, 12 JUST. SYS. J. 210 (1987).

16.

Part-time magistrates are appointed for renewable four-year terms by the district

judges. SMITH, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATES, supra note 7, at 4.

17. See infra notes 54-71 and accompanying text. Although the role of magistrates within
the federal district courts was initially conceptualized as that of a limited assistant to the judges,
Congress gradually expanded the magistrates' authority so that these subordinate judicial officers
can now undertake virtually any duties undertaken by district judges except for trying and sentencing felony defendants. See Christopher E. Smith, Assessing the Consequences of Judicial
Innovation: U.S. Magistrates' Trials and Related Tribulations, 23 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 455

(1988). Magistrates can even preside over complete civil trials with the consent of the litigants.
According to the Magistrates Act.
Upon the consent of the parties, a full-time United States magistrate or a part-time
United States magistrate who serves as a full-time judicial officer may conduct any or
all proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil matter and order the entry of judgment in the
case, when specially designated to exercise such jurisdiction by the district court or
courts he serves.
28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) (1988).
18. Because the precise role for magistrates was left intentionally undefined by Congress,
district judges can use magistrates according to the needs of their district and their own personal
preferences. For example, one study found that magistrates were used according to three distinctive models. Some magistrates were "Additional Judges" who handled their own civil cases and
other matters for the district courts. Other magistrates were "Team Players" who assisted judges
with evidentiary motions and other matters in preparing cases for trial before the district judges.
In addition, some magistrates were "Specialists" whose work was primarily confined to processing
Social Security disability appeals and prisoners' petitions. See Carroll Seron, Magistratesand the
Work of the Federal Courts: A New Division of Labor, 69 JUDICATURE 353 (1986). The develop-

ment of magistrates' particular roles within specific districts depends upon organizational characteristics of the districts and the judges' conceptions of the district courts' functions. See Carroll
Seron, The Professional Project of Parajudges: The Case of The U.S. Magistrates, 22 LAW &

Soc'Y REV. 557 (1988). In particular, a magistrate's precise role within a district court will be
determined by a number of specific factors: district judges' conceptualizations of magistrates'
roles; familiarity and communication between judges and magistrates; expectation of magistrates
about their roles within the district courts; practicing attorneys' expectations about appropriate
roles for magistrates; established patterns for magistrate utilization within a specific district court;
methods employed to assign tasks to magistrates; and the nature of the district's caseload. SMITH,
supra note 7, at 115-46.
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officers have been keenly interested in encouraging legislative developments that will enhance their status and authority within the federal
courts. 19 This article examines the issue of judicial lobbying on court
reform legislation by analyzing the magistrate judges' self-interested
efforts to protect and expand their status and authority during the enactment of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990.0
II.

JUDICIAL LOBBYING

Judges have a special interest in court reform legislation21 and,
because of their positions within the courts, they can have tremendous
influence over the development and success of court-reform initiatives.22
For example, if legislators attempt to impose new procedures with
which judges disagree, because of the fragmentation of power within

the judicial system, 8 individual judges may thwart the implementation
19. For example, the magistrates have their own national association, the National Council
of U.S. Magistrates, which works to improve the status, authority, salary, and benefits of the
federal courts' subordinate judicial officers. The National Council engaged in typical "interest
group" behavior by keeping its membership informed about issues and by attempting to influence
the Judicial Conference of the United States and Congress on behalf of the magistrates. SMITH,
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATES, supra note 7, at 168. Even magistrates who are not active in the
National Council display a strong interest in protecting and expanding their status and authority:
"Although not all magistrates agree that judicial officers should act as an interest group and many
magistrates do not participate in the national organization, the magistrates generally manifest
many characteristics of any occupational interest group that undertakes planned, political actions
on behalf of the group's collective interests." Id.
20. Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990).
21. Because judges supervise the administration of the judicial process, they have good reason to be concerned about how reform legislation will affect the courts. For example, when Congress considered legislation during the 1970s to require "speedy trials" in criminal cases, judges
evinced strong concerns about how the proposed reforms would affect both the administration of
justice and judges' traditional authority over the judicial branch: "Judges complained that the
bill's planning provisions encroached upon their management prerogatives, and that requiring
prosecutors, clerks, and other nonjudicial members of the criminal justice system to take part in
planning violated separation of powers." M. FEELEY. COURT REFORM ON TRIAL 164 (1983).
22. For example, judges played an influential role in the decision to divide the old Fifth
Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals into a smaller Fifth Circuit (including Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi) and a new Eleventh Circuit (including Alabama, Georgia, and Florida):
[T]he large Fifth Circuit was overloaded with cases and needed to be split into two new
circuits. This . . . was extremely controversial, because civil rights supporters feared
that splitting the Fifth Circuit and adding new judges would dilute important civil
rights gains made during the 1950s and 1960s. Congress took no early action. But, with
all of the judges in the Fifth Circuit supporting the split, Congress complied in 1980.
HENRY P. GLICK, COURTS, POLITICS, AND JUSTICE 41 (2d. ed. 1988).
23. Because so many interests have a stake in court reform, it can be extremely difficult for
reform proposals to avoid alteration or dilution in the legislative process. One scholar has characterized state court reform processes as producing inevitable compromises that do not achieve the
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of new practices within their courthouses. 4 Such judicial influence over
the effects of legislative enactments is an inevitable result of the autonomy and discretionary authority necessarily vested in judges. 5 By contrast, when judicial officers seek to initiate or to influence the formula-

tion of legislation, the judges' dependence upon legislative action forces
them to engage in the kinds of political strategies, such as lobbying and
persuasion, 26that other interested parties employ when seeking beneficial

legislation.

When judicial officers seek to influence the content of court-reform
legislation, they are governed by the ethical rules which constrain
judges' behavior. Under federal law, judges may not attempt to influence Congress by using public funds.17 According to the ethical pro-

scriptions directed at judges in the American Bar Association's Code of
Judicial Conduct, judges may testify before and consult with other

branches of government concerning the administration of justice. 28
Federal law mirrors this invitation for limited communications between
judges and legislators by declaring that the prohibition on the use of
reformers' initial goals: "Most compromises follow a familiar political pattern. Reformers propose
a far reaching package of judicial changes, but various legislators, lawyers, and judges criticize
and lobby against them. Finally, the reformers agree to withdraw some reforms, publicly stating
regret, but they also are pleased at what they could get."
Henry P. Glick, The Politics of Staie-Court Reform, in THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL REFORM 25
(Phillip L. DuBois ed. 1982).
24. For example, judges thwarted efforts to reform bail and sentencing policies in the criminal justice system: "A great many judges quite simply do not regard liberalized pretrial release or
mandatory sentences as desirable and [thus the judges] thwart [the new policies'] implementation." FEELEY, supra note 21, at 198.
25. In regard to criminal cases, the Supreme Court has acknowledged the importance of
judicial officers' discretion: "Implementation of [criminal justice] laws necessarily requires discretionary judgments. Because discretion is essential to the criminal justice process, we would demand exceptionally clear proof before we would infer that the discretion has been abused." McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 297 (1987).
26. Interest groups and their lobbyists "wield their vast resources-money, personnel, information, and organization-to bend the course of legislation." R. DAVIDSON & W. OLESZEK, CONGRESS AND ITS MEMBERS 349 (2d ed. 1985).
27. No part of money appropriated by any enactment of Congress shall, in the absence
of express authorization by Congress, be used directly or indirectly to pay for any personal service, advertisement, telegram, telephone, letter, printed or written matter, or
other device, intended or designed to influence in any manner a Member of Congress, to
favor or oppose, by vote or otherwise, any legislation or appropriation by Congress.
18 U.S.C. § 1913 (1988).
28. Canon Four (B) of the A.B.A.'s Code of Judicial Conduct states: "[A judge] may appear at a public hearing before an executive or legislative body-on matters concerning the law, the
legal system, and the administration of justice, and he may otherwise consult with an executive or
legislative body or official, but only on matters concerning the administration of justice."
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public funds for lobbying "shall not prevent officers ... of the United
States . . . from communicating to Members of Congress, through

proper official channels, requests for legislation or appropriations which
they deem necessary for the efficient conduct of the public business. '2 9
Although there are opportunities for limited interbranch communications, the concerns about the impropriety of judicial lobbying lead
judges to act cautiously when communicating with Congress. Judge
Frank Coffin, for example, believes that formal prohibitions on judicial
lobbying have detrimentally inhibited necessary communications between the branches of government.
The essence of the problem can be summed up by saying that the
overarching and simplistic commandment, "thou shalt not lobby,"
does not begin to recognize the multiple levels and purposes of desirable communication in both directions between the two great branches.
Worse, the negative nature of the commandment and its criminal
sanction chill any effort to explore ways of meeting perceived needs.8 0
Scholars have echoed Coffin's position that communications between
judges and Congress are not merely beneficial, but are indeed essen-

tial."' Despite the concerns that useful interbranch communications are
hindered, the United States Attorney General has actually interpreted
the statutory prohibition on lobbying by judges relatively loosely. The
Attorney General's interpretation permits relevant communications between judges and members of Congress without narrowly construing
the requirement that such communications pass through "official

channels." 32
29. 18 U.S.C. § 1913 (1988).
30. Frank Coffin, The FederalistNumber 86: On Relations between the Judiciary and Congress, in JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS: TOWARD INSTITUTIONAL COMITY 26-27 (R. Katzman ed.
1988).
31. The idea of judicial lobbying is anathema to many. It somehow seems inappropriate for federal judges, whose adjudicative role requires neutrality rather than advocacy,
to urge the passage or defeat of proposed legislation. In spite of its negative connotations, however, lobbying is nothing more than communicating information and considered opinion to the appropriate decisionmakers. No one has more accurate information
on matters of judicial administration or is in a better position to comment on conditions
facing the courts than the federal judge. . . .It is both proper and essential for this
communication process to function effectively.
BARROW & WALKER, supra note 9, at 258.
32. The Department of Justice has interpreted the "official channels" exception as allowing judges to expend appropriated funds for the purpose of contacting members and
congressional committees to express their views on legislation. Because federal judges
do not have direct superiors, the attorney general concluded that it was inappropriate to
engage in legalistic arguments as to whether federal judges speak through "proper offi-
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Although there are no strenuously-enforced, precise regulations on
judicial lobbying, judges must be concerned about the propriety of their
behavior in expressing their views about legislation. As characterized in
one study: "[J]udicial lobbying must occur under certain restraints and
limitations. Mindful of the proper judicial role, judges cannot roam the
corridors of Congress buttonholing members and pleading the case of
the courts.""3 Thus, federal judges must act carefully when they lay the
groundwork for effective, strategic communications with Congress concerning the administration of the federal courts. As one subtle strategy,
for example, the Budget Committee of the Judicial Conference of the
United States seeks to enhance its influence with Congress by being
comprised of judges "having ability, legislative experience, and congressional associations. 3 84 By exploiting preexisting relationships between judges who were appointed through the political process and the
members of Congress who helped to have them appointed, the judiciary
can presumably improve the efficacy of the communications that it initiates with the legislative branch about matters of self-interest, such as
the judicial budget and court reform.
A.

The Role of the Judicial Conference and the Chief Justice

Because judicial officers cannot behave like other lobbyists who
prowl the corridors of Congress and donate money to political campaigns, "articulating the views of the courts normally occurs through
well-established, institutionalized channels." 35 Thus, the Judicial Conference of the United States serves as the legislative liaison between the
federal judiciary and Congress.3 The Judicial Conference is "[t]he
central administrative policy-making organization of the federal judicial system . . .composed of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
as the presiding member, the chief judges of each of the judicial circuits, one district judge from each of the twelve regional circuits, and
the chief judge of the court of international trade. '3 7 Although there
cial channels" whenever they take a position with respect to matters of judicial concern.

Robert A. Katzmann, The Underlying Concerns, in JUDGES
TIONAL COMITY 14-15 (R. Katzman ed. 1988).

AND LEGISLATORS: TOWARD INSTITU-

33. Thomas G. Walker & Deborah J. Barrow, Funding the Federal Judiciary: The Congressional Connection, 69 JUDICATURE 43, 46 (1985).
34. Id. at 50.
35. Id. at 46.
36. See FISH, supra note 8, at 301-05.
37. ROBERT A. CARP & RONALD STIDHAM, THE FEDERAL COURTS 64, (2d ed. 1991).
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have been criticisms of the Judicial Conference's effectiveness in persuading Congress about the needs of the judiciary, s8 Congress often
defers to judges or seeks the Judicial Conference's endorsement when

considering court-reform legislation. For example, "[v]irtually all major legislation affecting the [Supreme] Court's jurisdiction was drafted

by Justices and was the result of their lobbying."'
Chief Justices who are keenly interested in court administration
can use the Conference's position and resources to educate and influence Congress.40 According to scholars who study the judiciary,
"[c]hief justices have a number of.

.

. ways of co-opting congressmen

and mobilizing support.' 14 A Chief Justice can "set[] the issue agenda
and provid[e] information" for Congress.

2

Former Chief Justice War-

ren Burger, in particular, used his leadership position on the Judicial
Conference as a means to influence Congress on behalf of the judiciary.
After [Chief Justice William Howard] Taft, Burger was the most active in lobbying Congress and getting the assistance of the ABA in
promoting his proposals. Beginning in 1978, Burger, his administrative assistant, and the directors of the Administrative Office [of the
United States Court] and the Federal Judicial Center met with the
attorney general and representatives of the Department of Justice, as
38. For example, the Judicial Conference relies upon the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts to gather statistics and to assist the judges in keeping Congress aware of the
judicial branch's needs. However, although the Administrative Office "is the official representative
of the Judicial Conference in Congress, . . . it is out of the mainstream of political party and
interest group politics and has not been very effective in obtaining money for the courts or congressional support for court proposals." GLICK, supra note 22, at 44.
39. DAVID M. O'BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS 128
(2d ed. 1990).
40. The creation of the Judicial Conference itself as well as the Administrative Office of the
U.S. Courts is attributable to the effective lobbying efforts of a Chief Justice, William Howard
Taft: "[T]he leadership of Chief Justice Taft is usually said to have been the most immediate
catalyst for administrative reform [of the federal courts]. He, more than any other single individual, was responsible for persuading Congress to have a new look at the organization of the federal
judiciary." STUMPF, supra note 13, at 142.
[Chief Justice Taft] loved being a judge and making difficult choices in hard controversies, but he was also a politician, a mover and shaker, and he held tenaciously to the
view that his office called for leadership across a broad spectrum of activities, and he
did not hesitate to use his prestige, his influence and his powers to achieve a more
efficient judicial system. Always Taft remembered that successful lobbying requires
strong personal involvement, attending committee hearings and keeping in touch with
sympathetic souls in high places who could wield influence over others.
ROBERT J. STEAMER. CHIEF JUSTICE: LEADERSHIP AND THE SUPREME COURT 186 (1986).
41.

O'BRIEN, supra note 39, at 30.

42.

JOHN BRIGHAM, THE CULT OF THE COURT 99

(1987).
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well as members of the House and Senate Judiciary Committees...
at a "Seminar on Judicial Administration" sponsored by the Brookings Institution. The occasion allowed Burger and his staff to press for
legislative changes. By delegating more of the congressional liaison
work to his administrative assistant and the legislative affairs office,
Burger was able to pursue a broad range of projects and devote his
own time to "hardsell" luncheons and to more personal appeals to
pivotal congressmen and presidential advisers."8
Burger's persistence paid dividends for the judiciary's efforts to influence court-reform legislation.""
Because the Chief Justice, as the formal head of the Judicial Conference, does not possess the exclusive authority to communicate with
Congress on behalf of the federal judiciary, there are opportunities for
other communication emanating from the judges which may give Congress "mixed signals." In one example, Chief Justice Rehnquist received an unusual public rebuke from a majority of the judges on the
Judicial Conference for submitting recommendations to Congress for
streamlining death penalty appeals without first receiving the approval
of the other judges on the Conference.' 6 The judges sent a letter to the
Senate Judiciary Committee to disassociate themselves and the Judicial
Conference from the proposal submitted to Congress by Rehnquist."'
On other occasions, "[judges and judicial employees who have lost or
fear the loss of their cause in the Conference arena continue to carry
their case to Congress without Conference authorization.""' Thus, because the federal judiciary is not a monolithic entity with uniform interests, the contradictory persuasive communications directed at Congress by federal judicial officers may harm the judiciary's image and
prestige in the eyes of Congress and thereby generate intra-judicial
conflicts.
43. O'BRIEN, supra note 39, at 130.
44. Burger conferred regularly with the President and Congress on the needs of the
judiciary to such an extent that in 1977 a resolution was introduced in the Senate
inviting the Chief Justice to address a joint session of Congress on the state of the
judiciary. Congress has also considered delegating to the Chief Justice special authority
in areas such as the promulgation of regulations with respect to the judicial branch on
the matter of garnishing of wages of federal employees.
BRIGHAM, supra note 42, at 98.
45. Linda Greenhouse, Judges Challenge Rehnquist's Action on the Death Penalty, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 6, 1989, at Al.

46.
47.

Id.
FISH, supra note 8, at 306.
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The Risks of Judicial Lobbying Strategies

Judicial officers' strategies for communicating with Congress may
not be limited to direct advice and lobbying. When federal judges
sought to have their salaries raised in 1989, for example, the Judicial
Conference authorized Chief Justice Rehnquist to hold an unprecedented press conference at the Supreme Court 48 in order to publicize
"the most serious threat to the future of the Judiciary and its continued
operations that [the judges] have observed. 4 9 Such hyperbole directed
at the public may diminish the judiciary's credibility when judges seek
to persuade Congress that some other problem also requires immediate
legislative attention.5 0 Moreover, by appealing for the public's assistance in pushing Congress to act, legislators may believe that the
judges have stepped beyond the proper established framework for direct inter-branch communications. Thus, there may be a risk that Congress will become less receptive to further requests and suggestions
from the judiciary.
Although judicial lobbying is a recurring aspect of the relationship
between Congress and the federal judiciary, such activities are not
without their risks. Fundamentally, because of widespread perceptions
that judicial lobbying clashes with the traditional image of proper judicial behavior,5" strategic political activity by judges aimed at influencing legislation "may [negatively] influence popular respect for, and
48. According to the New York Times, "it was the first news conference any Supreme
Court Justice has ever held at the Court to discuss any subject other than his own imminent
retirement." Linda Greenhouse, Rehnquist, in Rare Plea, Asks Raise for Judges, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 16, 1989, at 1.
49. Statement of Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist (March 15, 1989) (press release provided by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts on behalf of the Judicial Conference of the United States).
50. At the time of Rehnquist's press conference, federal judges' salaries placed them well
within the top 7 percent of families' incomes in the United States and fewer than 6 of the more
than 700 federal judges resigned each year-and only a portion of those resignations were attributable to dissatisfaction with salaries. See Christopher E. Smith, Federal JudicialSalaries: A Critical Appraisal, 62 TEMPLE L. REV.849 (1989).
51. Judges and others are very concerned that the judiciary maintains the appearance of
being removed from "politics." As Justice Harry Blackmun wrote in an opinion, "[tihe legitimacy
of the Judicial Branch ultimately depends on its reputation for impartiality and nonpartisanship."
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 407 (1989). Although there are questions about whether
the judiciary's image and "legitimacy" are so essential to its functional effectiveness, see Alan
Hyde, The Concept of Legitimation in the Sociology of Law, 1983 Wis. L. REv. 379, judicial
officers consistently speak about the importince of the courts' image. See Christopher E. Smith,
The Supreme Court in Transition:Assessing the Legitimacy of the Leading Legal Institution, 79
KY. L. J. 317, 322-26 (1990-91).
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confidence in, courts."52 There is also the potential for confusion and
conflict when judicial officers pursue contradictory legislative goals or
deviate from the established lines of communication between the Judicial Conference and Congress. Because the magistrate judges' interests
have diverged from those of many Article III federal judges, their legislative goals and lobbying activities have sometimes generated opposition from other actors within the federal judiciary.5 3
III.

THE U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGES WITHIN THE FEDERAL COURTS

Beginning in 1793, the federal courts employed lay "commissioners" who assisted judges with minor tasks such as handling petty offenses and warrants.5 4 Because of problems that stemmed from using
officials who lacked training in law, members of Congress began to advocate reform of the commissioner system in 1940."' The increasing
caseload pressures upon the federal courts during the 1960s helped to
place court reform upon the Congressional agenda. 6 In 1968, Congress
52.

John W. Winkle, III, Judges as Lobbyists: Habeas Corpus Reform in the 1940s, 68

JUDICATURE

263, 265 (1985).

53. See infra notes 86-103 and accompanying text.
54. Richard W. Peterson, The Federal Magistrates Act: A New Dimension in the Implementation of Justice, 56 IowA L. REv. 62, 66 (1970).
55. Reformers cited the following principal defects [in the commissioner system]: (1)
the lack of a requirement of bar membership for appointment as a commissioner; (2)
the unchecked freedom of the district courts to appoint and remove commissioners at
will; (3) the part-time status of virtually all the commissioners; (4) the lack of guidance
given to commissioners in the conduct of proceedings; (5) the basic impropriety of a fee
system for compensating judicial officers; (6) the inadequacy of the existing compensation levels; and (7) the insufficiency of support services provided to commissioners.
Peter G. McCabe, The Federal Magistrate Act of 1979, 16 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 343, 347 (1979).
56. The impetus for the reforms embodied in the creation of the office of United States
Magistrate derived from the substantial increases in the number of cases filed in the
federal courts during the 1960s. This increased caseload quickly exacerbated the extensive backlog problems with pending cases. For example, the federal courts had a backlog of 2,200 pending cases during 1960, but by 1966 the backlog had grown to 5,387.
During that same period, civil appeals increased by 96 percent; criminal appeals increased by 130 percent; and actions filed by prisoners increased by 280 percent. Because of the increase in litigation, members of Congress recognized that the federal
courts were overburdened and in need of additional resources.
SMITH, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATES, supra note 7, at 16.
According to a thorough empirical study of the federal district courts, the caseload
increases stemmed from changes occurring in American government and society: "During the 1960s and 1970s, . . . we witness again an increase in litigation due to the
social and political protest movements of these decades as well as to the 'due process
revolution' spawned by the social and procedural legislation of the 1960s."
WOLF HEYDEBRAND & CARROLL SERON, RATIONALIZING JUSTICE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
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passed the Federal Magistrates Act"' which replaced the commissioners with "U.S. magistrates," a newly created class of subordinate judicial officers trained in law.58 The magistrates were empowered to handle the minor tasks previously performed by commissioners as well as
to assist district judges with other case processing tasks.59 Congress
avoided providing a precise definition for the magistrates' role and authority because district judges were supposed to utilize these innovative,
new judicial officers according to each court's particular needs.60 The
district judges retained control over the magistrates not only through
their power to assign tasks to these judicial subordinates, but also
through their power to select the lawyers who would be appointed to
eight-year renewable terms as full-time magistrates or four-year renewable terms as part-time magistrates.
The vague statutory language authorizing magistrates to perform
"such additional duties as are not inconsistent with the Constitution
and laws of the United States"6 1 led to drastic differences in the manner in which these judicial officers were utilized within different districts because "[tlhe creation of a new judicial position . . . inevitably
creates uncertainty about exactly what role the new judicial officer is to
play."6 2 For example, the General Accounting Office found that "magistrates in [the Northern District of Ohio] generally performed only
duties which would have been handled previously by commissioners,
whereas 42 percent of the matters handled by magistrates in [the District of] Massachusetts were beyond the jurisdiction of former commissioners."63 Congress responded by amending the Magistrates Act in
1976 to invalidate court decisions6" interpreting the statute that had
49 (1990).
28 U.S.C. § 631-39 (1988).
See Joseph F. Spaniol, Jr., The Federal Magistrates Act: History and Development,
1974 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 565.
59. Id. at 568-70; Peterson, supra note 54, at 71-99.
60. As described by one former magistrate, "Under the 1968 Act, the functions of magistrates were primarily defined by district court judges, who were constrained by governing statutory authority." J. Vincent Aug, Jr., The Magistrate Act of 1979: From a Magistrate's Perspective, 49 CIN. L. REV. 363, 363 (1980).
61. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) (1968).
62. Smith, Who Are the U.S. Magistrates?, supra note 15, at 145.
63. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, THE U.S. MAGISTRATES: How THEIR SERVICES HAVE
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS

57.
58.

ASSISTED THE ADMINISTRATION OF SEVERAL DISTRICT COURTS; MORE IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED 9

(1974).
64. See, e.g., Wingo v. Wedding, 418 U.S. 461 (1974) (district judges lack authority under
the Magistrates Act to delegate to magistrates the responsibility for overseeing evidentiary hearings in habeas corpus cases).
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limited the duties which magistrates could perform.65 The new legislation sought to "affirm[] the broad range of duties which were already
being performed by magistrates in many districts[s]."16 In 1979, Congress broadened the power of magistrates by authorizing magistrates to
preside over complete civil trials with the consent of litigants. 7 In fact,
magistrates had already been supervising civil trials in some courts,6 8
so Congress merely endorsed and specified procedures for a practice
already in existence in thirty-six districts.69
After the expansion of magistrates' authority in the 1979 amendments to the Magistrates Act, these subordinate judicial officers could
undertake virtually any task performed by district judges except for
specific aspects of felony criminal cases.7" By 1990, after only two decades in existence, the magistrates were important components of the
federal district courts. There were 484 magistrates, including 323 fulltimers, who disposed of 418,711 matters for the federal courts, including 45,201 civil pretrial conferences, 4,220 civil and criminal evidentiary hearings, and 1,008 civil trials.71
A.

The Struggle for Status and Authority

Although Congress periodically expanded their formal authority,
"the magistrates confront an uphill battle to assert their professional
autonomy. "72 Because district judges within each courthouse control
the number and types of tasks assigned to magistrates, not all magistrates enjoy opportunities to exercise the complete range of their statutory authority. A study of the magistrates sponsored by the Federal
65. McCabe, supra note 55, at 351-55.
66. McCabe, supra note 55, at 354.
67. Upon the consent of the parties, a full-time United States magistrate or a parttime United States magistrate who serves as full-time judicial officer may conduct any
or all proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil matter and order entry of judgment in the
case, when specially designated to exercise such jurisdiction by the district court or
courts he serves.
8
28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1)(198 ).
68. H.R. Rep. No. 1364, 95th Cong., 2d Sess, pt.-., at 4 (1978).
69. If a magistrate is designated to exercise civil jurisdiction under paragraph (1) of this
subsection, the clerk of court shall, at the time the action is filed, notify the parties of their right
to consent to the exercise of such jurisdiction. The decision of the parties shall be communicated
to the clerk of the court. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(2)(1988).
70. See Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 872 (1989) ("additional duties" language in
statute did not authorize magistrates to supervise the selection of jurors in felony cases).
71. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 25, 43 (1990).

72.

Seron, The Professional Project, supra note 18, at 569.
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Judicial Center found that they could be divided into three general
roles within the various district courts:71 "Additional Judge" overseeing
a docket of complete civil cases; "Team Player" handling preliminary
stages of civil and criminal cases; and "Specialist" processing specific
categories of cases, primarily from prisoners and Social Security disability claimants. Differences in magistrates' roles within different
courthouses stem from judges' divergent conceptions of the appropriate
tasks to be performed by a subordinate judicial officer7 5 as well as other
factors, such as the composition of each district's caseload, the communication between judges and magistrates within each district, and
judges' knowledge about how magistrates are utilized in other
districts. 8
1. Magistrates' Aspirations and Strategies
Magistrates cannot control the definition of their status and authority as judicial officers. Their roles within the courts are primarily
determined by their supervising district judges:
The judges of the district court directly control the range of duties
and responsibilities of the magistrates whom they appoint, as well as
the procedures to be followed by the magistrates. Except for certain
duties formerly handled by United States commissioners under direct
authority of a statute or federal rule, all jurisdiction exercised by a
United States magistrate must be specifically delegated to him by a
district judge or court. This relationship was clearly summarized during Senate hearings on the 1968 Act. ... 7
Because they are acutely aware that colleagues in other districts
enjoy high status and broad authority,7 8 the magistrates formed a pro73. CARROLL SERON, THE ROLES OF MAGISTRATES: NINE CASE STUDIES 35-46 (1985).
74. The "Specialist" role, in particular, creates risks that magistrates will not apply considered judgments to all of the cases before them: "A study of U.S. magistrates indicates that although some magistrates have a special interest in Social Security cases, many other consider such
cases boring and burdensome." CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, COURTS AND THE POOR 69 (1990).
75.
76.

Seron, The Professional Project, supra note 18, at 565-67.
SMITH, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATES, supra note 7, at 115-44.

77. McCabe, supra note 55, at 369.
78. Magistrates learn about the level of status and authority possessed by their peers in
other districts from workload statistics from various districts gathered by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, publications from the Federal Judicial Center, meetings and publications
of the National Council of U.S Magistrates, and conversations with other magistrates at annual
circuit council meetings and Federal Judicial Center training conferences. SMITH, UNITED STATES
MAGISTRATES, supra note 7, at 125.
Magistrates' awareness of the status and authority enjoyed by their colleagues in other dis-
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fessional association, the National Council of U.S. Magistrates, to advance collectively their shared goal of expanding their role and importance within the federal courts. In 1988, 86 percent of the 292 full-time
magistrates were members of the Council and 60 percent of the 169
part-time magistrates were members.7 9 Individual magistrates often
have little hope of changing the role conceptions held by the district
judges for whom they work. Magistrates may gain status and authority
through communication with judges and through judicial performance
that increases "[t] he district judges' familiarity with the personal qualities and skills of the magistrates."8 0 However, the ability of magistrates
to prove themselves to judges is limited because "[tihe contact and
communication between [individual] magistrates and judges are affected by the different levels of status and authority possessed by the
two judicial officers." 8 1 When joined with other magistrates under the
auspices of a national organization, however, the magistrates can seek
beneficial actions by Congress or by the Judicial Conference which will
encourage district judges to recognize the magistrates as genuine federal judicial officers and to delegate to magistrates the complete range
tricts was illustrated by a description of a training session for magistrates sponsored by the Federal Judicial Center:
When magistrates . . . see th[e] level of respect granted their peers [in other districts],
they recognize the potential of their office. . . . At an annual training conference for
magistrates from three federal circuits, one magistrate addressed his colleagues about
the potential for obtaining litigants' consent for magistrate-supervised civil trials
through the use of the title "judge." He concluded his remarks by shaking his head
with an expression of sad disbelief, saying "there are still judges out there who won't
allow magistrates to be called 'judge'." Whereupon a magistrate, from a district noted
for its conflicts between judges and magistrates, yelled from the audience, "No kidding!" Although the magistrates at the conference laughed in commiseration with their
colleague, the emphasis given to the subject by the speaker and the abrupt interjection
by the magistrate in the audience indicated the heartfelt importance which title and
other aspects of status have for subordinate judicial officers.
Christopher E. Smith, The Development of a Judicial Office.- United States Magistrates and the
Struggle for Status, 14 J. LEGAL PROF. 175, 182-83 (1989).
79. Seron, The Professional Project, supra note 18, at 558 n.2.
80. SMITH, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATES, supra note 7, at 119.
81.
SMITH, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATES, supra note 7, at 120.
It can be very difficult for magistrates to forthrightly express opinions and concerns to
judges because of the magistrates' subordinate position and because the magistrates do
not wish to tarnish their images and relationships with [the judges]. . . . [M]agistrates
may have legitimate and valuable suggestions about how to improve the administration
of justice within a particular courthouse, yet [they may] fear that any suggestion [to
the judges] will be misperceived and tarnish the [magistrates'] reputation for diligence
and productivity.
Id. at 120-21.
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of authoritative tasks that the Magistrates Act permits these
subordinate judges to perform.
One primary goal of the magistrates' National Council was to improve the salary and benefits of magistrates. The National Council expended funds to secure the services of a professional lobbyist to assist
their efforts to gain greater material benefits."2 They succeeded in gaining Congressional action to upgrade their benefits and peg their salary
at 92 percent of district judges' salaries.83 Subsequently, during the Article III judges' successful campaign to gain a salary increase in
1989,8 ' the judges included the magistrates' "need" for a salary increase among their arguments to Congress about the importance of increasing compensation for federal judicial officers.
[Magistrates] contribute significantly to the administration of justice
in the United States and are an integral part of the Federal judicial
system. When their ranks suffer the debilitating effects of inadequate
compensation-in terms of ebbing morale, premature departures and
recruitment difficulties-the Judiciary as a whole suffers as well.88
As illustrated by the salary issue, when the magistrates succeeded in
linking their interests with those of the Article III judges, they benefitted from the judges' influence with Congress. By contrast, when the
magistrates' goals clash with those of the Article III judges, it is much
more difficult for the magistrates to succeed in influencing Congress.
2.

Conflicts With District Judges Over Status and Authority

On two particular issues, the definition of magistrates' status and
the effectuation of their broad statutory authority, the goals of these
judicial subordinates have been at odds with those of many district
judges. For these issues, the magistrates have faced their greatest difficulties in seeking to improve their position within the federal judiciary.
SMITH, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATES, supra note 7, at 168.
83. Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Bankruptcy Judges, Magistrates
Gain New Benefits; New Bankruptcy Judgeships Created, 20 THE THIRD BRANCH, Nov. 1988, at

82.

3.
84. Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Congress Passes Bill to Increase Salaries,
Limit Outside Income, 21 THE THIRD BRANCH, Nov. 1989, at 1, 1-2. ("The bill provides federal

judges, senior members of the executive branch, and members of the House of Representatives
with a 7.9 % salary increase effective January 1990. Judges and justices will gain a 25 % increase
in January 1991."). Id. at 1.
85.

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIAL BRANCH OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED

STATES, SIMPLE FAIRNESS: THE CASE FOR EQUITABLE COMPENSATION OF THE NATION'S JUDGES

81-82 (1988).
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In seeking to influence Congress and the Judicial Conference, the magistrates have been forced to overcome or to bypass the district judges
who oppose them. Without the unified support of the influential Article
III judges, it is much more difficult for the magistrates to be effective
in their judicial lobbying. When seeking to lobby Congress, magistrates
possess the same disadvantages as other judicial officers because of
their inability to contribute to the legislators' primary goal, namely reelection, through campaign contributions and other tactics available to
non-judicial lobbyists. Moreover, the magistrates also lack the political
connections that Article III judges possess from their pre-appointment
partisan activities which led to their positions on the federal bench. Because the magistrates are appointed by the district judges through a
"merit selection" process, 86 they lack the Article III judges' personal
relationships with party leaders and members of Congress.
a.

Concerns About Appropriate Status

Magistrates' concerns about their proper status within the federal
courts have focused upon their dissatisfaction with their title. Many
magistrates view the title "Judge" as a functional necessity for effective
performance when presiding over trials, evidentiary hearings, settlement conferences, and other contexts in which judicial officers need to
87
assert their official authority:
The magistrates recognize the value of high status. The title "Judge"
creates a clear image in the minds of lawyers and parties about expected deference and appropriate formal behavior in the presence of
an identifiable judicial officer. Magistrates have, in effect, a more authoritative voice when ruling on motions, guiding settlement negotiations, and undertaking other judicial tasks within their authority as
federal judicial officers. 88
The initial decision by Congress to call the newly created judicial
officers "Magistrates" caused serious problems in some states. Although "Magistrate" is a generic term for judicial officer and is a
respected title in the British legal system, its use in the American fed86.

See Smith, Merit Selection Committees, supra note 15, at 213-14.

87. "One magistrate described correcting his secretary when she occasionally slipped and
referred to him as 'the magistrate' instead of 'the judge' because he believed that consistent reinforcement of his judicial status, especially to lawyers who are not familiar with magistrates and
federal court procedures, helped to enhance his effectiveness." SMITH, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATES, supra note 7, at 81.
88. SMITH, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATES, supra note 7, at 80-81.
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eral courts "invite[s] comparisons to odious experiences with 'magistrates' and justices of the peace in judicial systems of some states." 89
Because several states use "Magistrate" as the title for low-level judi-

cial officers, 90 many attorneys who are unfamiliar with the federal
courts erroneously believe that U.S. magistrates are also lay judges

who possess only narrow authority over minor matters.91 Magistrates in
some districts have always been addressed as "Judge [X]" because the

district judges in those courts endorsed their subordinates as fullfledged federal judicial officers and insisted that attorneys give magistrates the complete measure of respect that any federal judicial officer
is entitled to receive.92 By contrast, district judges in other courts insisted that magistrates not be addressed as "Judge" because they
wanted to distinguish themselves from their judicial subordinates.
Thus, "these judges have instructed staff members to ensure that magistrates are never addressed as 'judge'."93 Although the magistrates'

National Council and magistrates within specific circuits and districts
sought to encourage an official change in title, with "Associate Judge"
the most frequently mentioned alternative,94 officials at the Administrative Office of the United States Courts attempted to downplay the title
controversy for fear that certain district judges would become antago89.

THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES SYSTEM: REPORT TO CONGRESS BY THE JUDICIAL CONFER-

60 (Dec. 1981).
90. In one survey, nearly half of the members of the Federal Bar Association indicated that
they would prefer a new title for the U.S. magistrates:
Those who would prefer a change in title state that the term "magistrate" has traditionally referred to a low-level local official who performs a narrow range of functions
in criminal case, i.e., a justice of the peace. They point out that this traditional association of the term is inaccurate when applied to the full-time United States magistrates.
They also note that many state magistrates are not well regarded and some have been
prosecuted for wrongdoing.
id. at 62.
91. Supportive district judges have attempted to educate the bar about magistrates' status
and authority as federal judicial officers through formal meetings, conversations during litigation
conferences, and letters to litigants in specific cases. Smith, Assessing the Consequences, supra
note 17 at 472.
92. SMITH, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATES, supra note 7, at 80-81.
93. Smith, The Development of Judicial Office, supra note 78, at 181. Judges may express
their status concerns in several ways: "Several judges ... complained . . .that magistrates improperly think they are judges. Another judge became angry when a memorandum addressed to
the district's judges was sent to the district's magistrates and when magistrates' names were included on a list of judges." Id. at 180.
94. "The titles 'Associate Judge' and 'Deputy Judge' were among the alternatives to 'Magistrate' that had been discussed when the office was created." SMITH, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATES, supra note 7, at 185.
ENCE OF THE UNITED STATES
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nized, and thereby oppose other aspects of magistrates' status and
authority.
One official at the Administrative Office, a strong supporter of broad
authority for magistrates, made the difficulties of this issue quite clear
when, upon being told that magistrates in at least one district answer
their telephones with the words "Judge [X]'s office," visibly cringed
and expressed the hope that certain district judges would not learn of
this practice. 9"
Magistrates tried without success to get the Judicial Conference
and the Chief Justice to assist with their efforts to secure a title that
would more effectively convey their appropriate status and authority
within the federal courts. 96
In addition to the controversy over the appropriate title for their
judicial office, magistrates in several districts have sought other attributes of status that are accorded to their colleagues elsewhere. For example, magistrates in a few districts have not been permitted to wear
the traditional black robe that indicates to attorneys and litigants that
they are indeed authoritative judicial officers. 97 Other petty actions by
judges in several districts heightened the magistrates' desire to gain
95.

Smith, The Development of a Judicial Office. supra note 78, at 183.

96. [1]n what could be regarded as a minor symbol of rebellion, the magistrates in one
circuit voted to recommend to the Judicial Conference that U.S. magistrates henceforth
be known as "Associate Judges." ... Because many judges vigorously oppose any title
change that might reduce the differentiation between district judges and magistrates
and, moreover, because the magistrates also sought other goals related to pay and benefits, leaders of the [National Council] persuaded the circuit group to rescind their resolution. Instead the national leaders attempted to utilize less formal means to improve
the status of magistrates, such as having friendly district and circuit judges attempt to
persuade the Chief Justice of the United States to issue an internal memorandum to the
federal judiciary permitting the use of the title "Judge" for magistrates. According to
some magistrates, former Chief Justice Burger insisted on the title "Magistrate," but
they hope[d] that Chief Justice Rehnquist [would] be less rigid.
SMITH. UNITED STATES MAGISTRATES, supra note 7, at 185.
A recent photograph in the monthly newsletter of the federal courts showed Chief Justice Rehnquist standing with three magistrates, the chief of the Administrative Office's
Division of Magistrates, and the judge who chairs the Judicial Conference's Magis-

trates Committee after this small group met to "discuss items of mutual interest concerning the operation of the federal magistrate system." Although one can only speculate on the precise content of the discussions in this meeting, the composition of the
group indicates that they probably used the occasion to educate the Chief Justice on the
concerns of magistrates.
Smith, The Development of a Judicial Office, supra note 78, at 195, citing 20 THE THIRD
BRANCH 3, July 1988, at 3.
97. SERON. THE ROLES OF MAGISTRATES, supra note 73, at 63.
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greater status through actions by Congress or the Judicial Conference:
An official at the Administrative Office stated that the biggest continuing problem within the magistrate system involves those districts in
which judges will not permit the magistrates to park in the courthouse
parking lot, eat in the judges' lunchroom, or do other things which,
although sometimes minor in a practical sense, embody a significant
symbolic message about an individual's status within a courthouse.98
b.

Concerns About Exercising Full Authority

Magistrates also sought to gain the full authority granted to them
by Congress in the Magistrates Act. In particular, magistrates want to
supervise complete civil trials with the consent of litigants.9 9 However,
many district judges believe that judicial subordinates should not have
such broad authority:
In order for a district's judges to designate magistrates to handle complete civil cases by consent of the litigants, the judges not only must
view the magistrates as competent to handle such cases but also must
be willing to share the status and prestige of a presiding federal trial
officer with the magistrates. 10 0
As indicated by the foregoing discussion of magistrates' concerns
about status, many district judges are unwilling to acknowledge that
magistrates are authoritative judicial officers. Thus, magistrates in
many districts are assigned only a limited range of tasks by their supervising judges. 10 1 Because Congress placed magistrates under the control
of district judges in order to avoid constitutional concerns about excessive judicial authority reposed in non-Article III officials, 0 2 the magis98. Smith, The Development of a Judicial Office, supra note 78, at 184.
99. By refusing to enable magistrates to preside over at least some civil trials, district
judges can cause morale problems within their courts. In one district court,
several magistrates were appointed who have substantial experience and, most importantly, high expectations and ambitions about the role of the magistrate. As the magistrates continued to be assigned limited tasks, disappointment, frustration, and disenchantment were plainly evident. . . . Several magistrates accepted the position
because they [had] expected that the judges would eventually designate them to handle
trials ....
SMITH, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATES, supra note 7, at 72.
100. Smith, Assessing the Consequences, supra note 17, at 467.

The Roles of Magistrates, supra note 73, at 69-92.

101.

SERON,

102.

There were concerns expressed in Congress that judicial officers, such as magistrates,

who lacked the attributes of Article III judges (i.e., presidential appointment, Senate confirmation, and protected tenure and salaries) should not exercise judicial authority. Congress sought to
avoid any constitutional problems by placing the magistrates under the supervision and control of
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trates sought to have the Judicial Conference and the Chief Justice
encourage district judges to use the full extent of magistrates' statutory

authority.103
IV.

A.

COURT REFORM INITIATIVES AFFECTING MAGISTRATES

The Magistrates and Senator Biden's Proposed Legislation

In the late 1980s, Senator Joseph Biden, the chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, actively joined the current policy trend toward advocating court reform legislation that would reduce the costs
and delays that plague the growing litigation caseloads within the federal courts. 04 In order to identify specific desirable reforms and to
place court reform on the legislative agenda, Biden asked the respected
Brookings Institution to undertake a study of civil litigation in the federal courts. When the Brookings Institution's Task Force published its
Article III district judges. According to the congressional report on magistrates' expanded authority to supervise civil trial by consent, the exercise of judicial authority by non-Article III judicial
officers passed constitutional muster for three reasons:
First, the magistrate is an adjunct of the United States District Court, appointed
by the court and subject to the court's direction and control. When the magistrate tries
a case, jurisdiction remains in the district court and is simply exercised through the
medium of the magistrate.
Second, both parties must consent to trial before a magistrate and must consent to
entry of final judgment by the magistrate for the district court.
Third, in all instances an appeal from a magistrate's decision lies in an Article III
court.
HR. REP. No. 1364, supra note 68, at 11.
103. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
104. Because there is a perception that the United States is burdened by too much litigation
which serves to increase the costs of legal services, medical insurance premiums, and general expenses for business operations, see JETHRO K. LIEBERMAN, THE LITIGIOUS SOCIETY (1981), there
have been many legislative proposals to place caps on civil damage awards, encourage alternative
dispute resolution, and otherwise reduce costs and delays in litigation:
Courts began to find themselves inundated with new filings, triggering cries of alarm
from the judicial administration establishment. At the same time, judicial congestion,
with its concomitant delay, led to claims of denial of access to justice.
One response to these problems was a demand for more judges and more courtrooms; another was a search for alternatives to the courts.
STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG, ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION 6 (1985).
The third alternative to increasing judicial resources and moving cases out of the court system is the reform of court procedures themselves. Senator Biden was not alone in seeking court
reform. Vice President Dan Quayle issued a controversial report in 1991 arguing for litigation
reform as a means to increase the competitiveness of American business by reducing the burden of
legal costs upon business. See PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, AGENDA FOR CIVIL
JUSTICE REFORM IN AMERICA (Aug. 1991).
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recommendations,'0 5 Biden used the Brookings report as the basis for
proposed legislation to reduce costs and delays in federal civil litigation.
The report's recommendation concerning the U.S. magistrates directly
threatened the subordinate judicial officers' aspirations and lobbying efforts for greater status and authority: "Procedural Recommendation
11: Ensure in each district's plan that magistrates do not perform tasks
best performed by the judiciary."' 06 This recommendation presented an
ominous threat to both of the magistrates' primary goals. "Tasks best
performed by the judiciary" seemed to imply quite directly that district
judges rather than magistrates should preside over civil trials. Thus, if
embodied in legislation, the magistrates' aspirations for broad authority
could be jeopardized. Moreover, the reference to "the judiciary" as an
entity separate from the magistrates implied that magistrates were not
genuine, authoritative officials who deserve the status of judicial decision makers within the federal courts.
In January of 1990, Senator Biden submitted to Congress a bill
entitled the "Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990"107 that embodied the
recommendations of the Brookings Task Force. Biden's bill contained
several proposals to limit the permissible range of authoritative tasks to
be undertaken by magistrates. One provision contained "[a] requirement that . . . a mandatory discovery-case management conference,

presided over by a judge and not a magistrate, be held in all cases
within 45 days following the first responsive pleading."10 From the
magistrates' perspective, the net effect of this provision would be not
only to forbid magistrates from overseeing an important step in the
civil litigation process, it would also involve district judges more intimately in every civil case and thereby reduce the likelihood that magistrates would assume complete control over any civil cases. Another provision would have had similar limiting effects upon magistrates' goal of
expanding their authoritative responsibilities: "[F]or cases assigned to
the track designated for complex litigation, calendar a series of monitoring conferences, presided over by a judge and not a magistrate, for
the purpose of extending stipulations, refining the formulation of issues
105.

See

BROOKINGS INSTITUTION TASK FORCE, JUSTICE FOR ALL: REDUCING COSTS AND

DELAY IN CIVIL LITIGATION

(1989); Robert E. Litan, Speeding Up Civil Justice, 73

162 (1989).

106.

BROOKINGS INSTITUTION TASK FORCE,

107.
108.

S. 2027, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
Id. at § 471(b)(3).

supra note 105, at 28.
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and focusing and pacing discovery." 109 This proposed provision explicitly sought to diminish magistrates' authority over and participation in
key phases of civil litigation. Thus, if judges were required to participate in scheduling conferences and to monitor the course of discovery
in every case, there would be little incentive for the litigants to consent
later to have the trial heard by a "stranger" to the case, namely a
magistrate.
Biden compounded his threat against the magistrates' aspirations
by denigrating their potential independence and effectiveness as judicial officers in his statement introducing the legislation:
[T]he [pretrial] conference may lose some of its significance in the
minds of the attorneys if presided over by a magistrate, since the unfortunate fact is that many attorneys seem to be far more willing to
take frivolous positions before a magistrate. . . . [M]agistrates may
themselves be more reluctant than judges to frame the contours of
litigation, limit discovery, establish a date certain briefing schedule
and address the full panoply of discovery-case management conference issues.110
Whether or not Biden's comments accurately describe specific magistrates in some districts, magistrates generally regard themselves as fullfledged judicial officers and do not hesitate to assert their authority
over attorneys."'
B.

The Magistrates' Reaction

Within days of the introduction of Biden's bill in Congress, the
National Council of United States Magistrates leaped into action to
consider tactics for counteracting the undesirable aspects of the proposed legislation. As indicated by a letter sent by one National Council
officer to all of the leaders within the organization, the magistrates
quickly identified potential lobbying strategies and useful allies: 1 2
109. Id. at § 471(b)(3)(I).
110. 136 CONG. REC. S414, S418 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1990) (statement of Sen. Biden).
111. One observational study of magistrates describe their assertive, authoritative behavior
during hearings, conferences, and other contexts of interaction with lawyers and litigants. For
example, in one incident after an attorney was late for the third time in coming to a conference
with the magistrate, "[tihe magistrate, in robe, went on the bench in the courtroom when the
attorney arrived and went 'on the record' to discuss the attorney's tardiness . .

.

. While the

attorney was simultaneously apologizing and fumbling for a new, more original excuse, . . . the
magistrate sternly announced, "if you [arrive late] again, there will be a price to be paid. Do we
understand each other?" SMITH, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATES, supra note 7, at 93.
112. The official who provided a copy of the letter to the author granted permission for it to
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Should we take an activist or passivist role? If we ignore [the Brookings Task Force report], might it go away? Should we rely on others,
such as the Magistrates Division [of the Administrative Office] and
the Judicial Conference to protect our interests?
Should we send an immediate response to the Task Force? . . .
As our members find out about the report, we must be prepared to tell
them what the Council is doing about it and why.
• . . [O]ne of the first things we should do is find out as many
details as we can about the proposed legislation. Here we should call
on [the lobbyist we employed to work for us previously to gain better
benefits] ...
I suggest we should attempt to marshal as much support as we
can. Possibly we should contact the Federal Judges Association and
coordinate with them. . . . Our most persuasive support would appear to be the trial bar. If there are other bar association groups like
the Iowa State Bar which would openly support us, that should be
very helpful. If [we] can obtain support from the ABA, that should be
helpful too.
I am concerned about relying on support from the Judicial Conference since we have been told that Senator Biden plans fast action
on the bill. The Judicial Conference is generally slow to react.
As indicated by the letter, because the magistrates themselves
have only a limited ability to lobby Congress effectively, they attempted to identify potential allies who could influence legislators on
their behalf. Article III judges, who "carried the ball" for the magistrates when successfully obtaining increased judicial salaries, 1 ' and
private attorneys, who have the ability to apply traditional political
pressure to elected officials through their campaign contributions and
their votes, stood out as potential allies that might have the greatest
influence over Congress. Interestingly, the magistrates indicated skepticism about the effectiveness of the institutionalized channel for communicating with Congress, namely the Judicial Conference, and therefore
immediately considered their other strategic options for protecting their
interests against threatening legislative proposals. The leaders of the
National Council also acknowledged in the letter that they had to prepare to keep their constituents (i.e., the magistrates nationwide) informed and involved as lobbying strategies developed.
be quoted but asked that the individuals who sent and received the letter not be identified by
name.
113. See supra note 84.
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Simultaneous Developments Favoring Magistrates' Aspirations

Fortunately for the magistrates, the timing of the Brookings Task
Force Report and the Biden legislation coincided with other developments aimed at pressuring Congress to expand the magistrates' status
and authority. In 1989, the Magistrates Division of the Administrative
Office of the U.S. Courts and the Magistrates Committee of the Judicial Conference issued jointly a report recommending, among other
things, that the magistrates' title be changed and that litigants be given
more encouragement to consent to have civil trials supervised by magistrates.11 In a manner analogous to the executive branch agencies that,
according to traditional political science literature, are "captured" by
the interest groups that they supposedly supervise and regulate, the
Magistrates Division serves as a supportive advocate for the aspirations
of the magistrates. 115 Theoretically, the Administrative Office of U.S.
Courts, of which the Magistrates Division is a component, serves the
Article III judges on the Judicial Conference. 6 By openly supporting
the magistrates' aspirations, officials in the Magistrates Division did
not follow the expectations of the many Article III judges who demanded that magistrates be given only limited status and authority.
In addition, in 1989 Chief Justice William Rehnquist appointed a
separate "blue ribbon commission" comprised of federal judges and
lawyers that examined practices and procedures in the federal courts in
order to consider potentially beneficial court reforms. The Federal
Courts Study Committee's 1990 report made recommendations that
contradicted those by the Brookings Task Force by advocating that
"Congress . . .allow district judges and magistrates to remind the parties [in civil litigation] of the possibilities of consent to civil trials
114.

U.S. Magistrates: Part of the Problem or a Key to the Solution?, 4 INSIDE LITIGA-

TION 1, 17 (Feb. 1990).

115. During a Federal Judicial Center training conference for magistrates from several
circuits, it was apparent that magistrates exhibit many of the characteristics one would
expect from any interest group. Virtually all of the magistrates scheduled to address the
conference on relevant developments in case law devoted significant portions of their
speeches to discussion of status, salary, and pension issues affecting magistrates. These
talks were so explicitly addressed to magistrates as a group that they even included
reports on lobbying expenditures and political activities by the magistrates' national
association. Throughout these digressions, as well as in other portions of the conference,
it was apparent that the representatives of the Federal Judicial Center and the Administrative Office were "captured" bureaucrats who support the goals and aspirations of
the interest group that they are responsible for managing (footnote omitted).
Smith, The Development of a Judicial Office, supra note 78, at 194-95.
116. GLICK, supra note 22, at 44.
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before magistrates."1'17 In effect, the Committee recommended a statutory change that would support magistrates' aspirations for broader authority by encouraging the creation of more opportunities for magistrates to preside over complete civil trials.
V.

JUDICIAL LOBBYING AND THE JUDICIAL IMPROVEMENTS ACT OF

1990
A.

Convergence of Judges' and Magistrates' Interests

When faced with the threat from Biden's proposed legislation, the
magistrates benefitted from a convergence of their interests with those
of the Article III judges. Biden's bill not only proposed limiting magistrates' participation in certain pretrial conferences, it simultaneously
attempted to require that district judges follow a particular case-management procedure. 1 Biden sought to require district judges to preside
over certain pretrial conferences. Thus, district judges were motivated
to oppose the bill because it would interfere with their autonomy and
authority in the management of litigation rather than because it would
limit the authority of magistrates.
Prominent district judges testified in opposition to the bill by arguing that limitations on magistrates' tasks and authority would hamper
the proposed legislation's underlying purpose of improving caseprocessing efficiency: "[T]he proposed diminution of the role of magistrates would reverse improvements made in civil case management
through the increased use of magistrates, and would result in a vastly
greater need for more life-tenured judges."1' 1 The judges also refuted
Senator Biden's assertions which implied that magistrates were not sufficiently independent and powerful as judicial officers to control the
course of civil litigation:
[Magistrates] have informed me that it is a rare occasion indeed, that
any attorney .ever takes a frivolous position when appearing before
them. If that should occur in some districts, I suspect that it is more
of a reflection of how the magistrates are perceived by the Article III
judges, and what duties or powers those judges have permitted the
117. FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 79 (Apr. 2, 1990).

118. See supra notes 107-11 and accompanying text.
119. Aubrey Robinson, Prepared Statement of the Hon. Aubrey Robinson, Jr., Chief Judge
of the U.S. District Court, District of the District of Columbia, Presented in Testimony Before
the Senate Judiciary Committee During Consideration ofS. 2027, The Civil Justice Reform Act
of 1990 4 (Mar. 6, 1990).
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magistrates to perform. If that suspicion be true, one way to address
the concerns of the [Brookings] Task Force is to leave the matter of
who presides at the conference to the discretion of the district court in
adopting its plan. 120

Although the National Council of United States Magistrates
feared that the Judicial Conference would react too slowly to influence
Congress concerning the proposed legislation, in fact, the Conference
acted swiftly at its March 1990 meeting by voting to oppose Biden's
bill. 121 Thus, the federal judiciary was united in opposition to the legislation and, as indicated by studies of judicial lobbying, Congress is especially receptive to communications from judicial officers when the
judges appear to speak with a unified voice.1" Congress scrapped
Biden's proposal and proceeded to work with the federal judiciary to
develop alternative court-reform legislation. As a result, Congress eventually passed the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990123 instead of
Biden's Civil Justice Reform bill.
B.

Judicial Lobbying and Interbranch Conflict

In the Judicial Improvements Act that was ultimately passed by
Congress, the unified federal judiciary achieved its goals of gaining
newly created judgeships and avoiding "micro-management" instructions from Congress on how to conduct pretrial hearings. 2 , Although
the judicial lobbying effort was ultimately successful in derailing
Biden's proposals and replacing them with the judiciary's desired alternatives, the judges' tactics during the formulation of the legislation irri120. Richard Enslen, Prepared Statement of the Hon. Richard Enslen, U.S. District Judge
for the Western District of Michigan, Presented During Testimony Before the Senate Judiciary
Committee During Consideration of S. 2027, The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 45 (Mar. 6,
1990).
121. Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Judicial Conference Acts on Habeas Corpusl
Civil Reform, 22 THE THIRD BRANCH 1 (Apr. 1990).
122. BARROW & WALKER, supra note 9, at 255; FISH, supra note 8, at 324.
123. See supra note 20.
124. Instead of imposing precise requirements upon the district judges for their participation in pretrial conferences and other case management matters that have traditionally been controlled by judges' autonomous discretionary decisions, the Act required all districts to develop
their own plans for improving case-processing efficiency: "There shall be implemented by each
United States district court, in accordance with this title, a civil justice expense and delay reduction plan." 28 U.S.C. § 471 (1991); "In formulating the provisions of its civil justice expense and
delay reduction plan, each United States district court, in consultation with an advisory group
shall consider and may include . . . litigation management and cost and delay reduction
....
techniques [listed in the statute]." 28 U.S.C. § 473(b) (1991).
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tated members of the Senate Judiciary Committee because it appeared
that the judges' viewpoints and priorities changed abruptly as the legislation was being shaped to suit the judiciary. In particular, the members of the Senate Judiciary Committee believed that a specific fourmember task force of federal judges appointed by Chief Justice Rehnquist contained the spokespersons for the judiciary. After working
closely with the judges on the task force, the senators were annoyed
when the Judicial Conference subsequently voiced formal opposition to
Senator Biden's legislative proposals and pushed the legislators to make
further alterations in the court-reform bill. The Senate Judiciary Committee's report on the legislation described the "[n]egotiation between
the [Clommittee and the [Judicial Conference's four-member] task
force [that] proceeded for several months, often on a daily basis." 12
The report raised strong criticisms of the judiciary's lobbying tactics
and expressed concern that the judges had harmed the relationship between the judiciary and Congress:
The [Senate Judiciary] [C]ommittee complied with the request of the
Judicial Conference to work with one body [i.e., the four-judge task
force appointed by Chief Justice Rehnquist], only to have the Conference seemingly defer to another body [i.e., the Conference's Committee on Judicial Improvements]-which had no role whatsoever in the
discussions and negotiations-at the point of decision. Such actions
only serve to undermine the cooperative relationship between Congress and the judicial branch that our citizens rightly expect and
deserve."'
The senators' frank acknowledgement of their negotiations and cooperation with the judges in shaping the legislation confirms the power possessed by the Judicial Conference for influencing Congress on matters
of court reform. Moreover, the senators' relatively strong expression of
anger at the contradictory signals communicated by the judiciary concerning the proposed court-reform provisions indicates that the judges'
effectiveness and credibility may be at risk when their judicial lobbying
appears to the legislators to be inconsistent.
C.

The Judicial Improvements Act and Magistrates' Goals

Although the magistrates initially began their judicial lobbying
strategies as a defensive effort to stave off proposed legislation that
125.
126.

S. REP. No. 416, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1990).
Id. at 5.

UALR LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 14:163

threatened their authority,12 7 they ultimately exceeded their most optimistic expectations for expanding their status and authority.
1. Magistrates' Improved Status
The Judicial Improvements Act of 1990 enhanced the magistrates'
status as authoritative judicial officers. The Act's "definitions" section
clearly endorsed the status and legitimacy of magistrates within the
federal judiciary. Unlike the Brookings Task Force report that distinguished magistrates from "the judiciary,"128 the Judicial Improvements
Act stated emphatically that magistrates are officially members of the
federal judiciary: "As used in this chapter, the term 'judicial officer'
means a United States district court judge or a United States magistrate" (emphasis supplied). 29
More importantly, the magistrates obtained their long-sought title
change through a provision which was added as a noncontroversial
amendment that was never the subject of legislative hearings. As a result of the enactment of the Judicial Improvements Act in December
1990, the subordinate judicial officers shall henceforth be known as
"United States magistrate judge[s]."'3 a Although many of these judicial officers wanted to disassociate themselves completely from the term
"Magistrate," the new compromise title permits them to begin calling
themselves "Judges" and they have begun to do so even in courts in
which district judges had previously forbidden them from calling themselves anything other than "Magistrates." The new title may give the
magistrate judges more respect and credibility in the eyes of litigants
and lawyers who do not understand the full breadth of magistrate
judges' authority as federal judicial officers. In addition, the new title
may help to increase magistrate judges' authority by encouraging more
litigants to consent to have their civil cases heard by the district courts'
subordinate judicial officers. The previous title, "Magistrate," may
have deterred litigants from trusting magistrate judges' authority and
effectiveness as trial judges: "Many litigants may automatically prefer
to have their cases decided by someone bearing the title 'judge.' As a
See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
"Procedural Recommendation 11: Ensure in each district's plan that magistrates do
not perform tasks best performed by the judiciary." BROOKINGS INSTITUTION TASK FORCE, supra
note 105, at 28.
129. 28 U.S.C. § 482 (1990).
130. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650 § 321, 104 Stat. 5089, 5117
(1990).
127.
128.
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result, the magistrates los[t] opportunities to gain visibility and build
their reputations as judicial officers, and the potential flexibility and
judicial economy of the magistrate system [were] diminished.' 31
2.

Magistrates' Enhanced Authority

Biden's original proposal to exclude magistrates from pretrial casemanagement conferences'
was scrapped in favor of a more flexible
provision requiring district courts to study their own procedures in order to develop plans for implementing effective case management practices.'3 8 In addition, the legislation ultimately enacted by Congress in
December 1990 advanced magistrates' goal of gaining greater actual
authority by amending the Magistrates Act to permit district judges
and magistrates to "advise the parties of the availability of [a] magistrate" for civil consent trials.' 3 ' The statute previously prevented judicial officers from mentioning the consent trial option to litigants because of a fear that litigants might feel pressured to consent. 1 5 Any
communications regarding consent to a magistrate's jurisdiction were
supposed to be exclusively between the clerk of court and the litigants.' 36 However, because clerks in some districts did not diligently
fulfill their responsibilities for informing litigants about magistrates'
131. Smith, The Development of a Judicial Officer, supra note 78, at 182,
132. See supra notes 107-11 and accompanying text.
133. See supra note 124.
134. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(2) (1990).
135. By requiring all communications concerning consent to flow between the clerk of court
and the litigants, Congress sought to prevent any coercion of litigants by district judges who did
not wish to hear a particular case or by magistrates who were eager to gain consents that would
enable them to preside over trials. According to the House Report on the 1979 Magistrates Act
that created magistrates' authority over consent trials:
The consent procedure is to be handled by the clerk of court. The response of the party
is not to be conveyed to the district judge, and the district judge is not to attempt any
inducement, subtle or otherwise, to encourage magistrate trials. This language is an
important safeguard against what has been characterized as the "velvet blackjack"
problem. Some judges may be tempted to force disfavored cases into disposition before
magistrates by intimations of lengthy delays manufactured in district court if the parties exercise their rights to stay in that court.
H.R. REP. No. 1364, supra note 68, at 13-14.
136. The statute's previous wording made congressional intentions clear:
[T]he clerk of court shall, at the time the action is filed, notify the parties of their right
to consent to the exercise of such jurisdiction. The decision of the parties shall be communicated to the clerk of court. Thereafter, neither the district judge nor the magistrate shall attempt to persuade or induce any party to consent to reference of any civil
matter to a magistrate.
28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(2) (1982).
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authority over consent trials, under the statute's previous wording,
many litigants never even learned that they had the option of having
their trial date accelerated by consenting to have a magistrate preside
over the case."'7 The new statutory language will make it more likely
that litigants will consent to have magistrates preside over their civil
trials because there will be more opportunities for court personnel, including judges and magistrate judges, to inform litigants about their
options. If the enhanced ability to provide information to litigants results in more magistrate-supervised trials, the magistrates who enjoy
more opportunities to conduct trials will feel that they have moved
closer to fulfillment of their complete authority under the Magistrates
Act.
3.

Continuing Limitations

The magistrate judges have now attained the primary goals that
motivated their National Council's lobbying interests. The title "Magistrate Judge" is probably the best that they could hope for in light of
historic and continuing opposition by many district judges to proposals
that would permit the judicial subordinates to be called "Judges." The
increased opportunities to educate litigants about the availability of
magistrate judges for civil cases will certainly lead to more of the consent trials which represent the most significant and desired exercise of
broad judicial authority by the subordinate judicial officers. In addition, because magistrate judges' salaries and benefits are now nearly
equal to those of district judges, 3 8 Congress has effectively conferred
upon the lower tier of judicial officers the benefits, status, and authority
that the magistrate judges strove to attain through their judicial lobby137. The example of one district illustrates how clerks of court failed to inform litigants
about the option of consenting to a magistrate's civil trial authority:
A 1985 addendum to the district's local court rules, entitled "Order Regarding Civil
Jurisdiction of United States Magistrates," outlined in detail the steps to be taken by
litigants in order to consent to have a magistrate preside over a civil case. The addendum included the statement that the "clerk of court shall notify parties in all civil cases
that they may consent to have a magistrate conduct any or all proceedings in the case
and order the entry of a final judgment." The author asked the court clerk's office why
routine universal notice had not led any parties to consent. "What notice?" came the
reply from the clerk's office. The personnel in the clerk's office had never even heard of
the two-year-old addendum to the local court rules . . . . Apparently the judges had
adopted standard language regarding consent jurisdiction for magistrates, but no one
had ever followed through by notifying the concerned parties.
SMITH, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATES, supra note 7, at 84-85.
138. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
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ing. Despite their success in achieving their legislative goals, however,
the magistrate judges continue to face practical problems beyond the
control of legislation that harm their status, authority, and
effectiveness.
As "adjuncts" of the Article III judges, the magistrates will continue to have their task assignments controlled by the district judges for
whom they work. The National Council and its organized lobbying
strategies will have little effect upon the individual district judges who
continue to believe that it is improper for magistrate judges to exercise
judicial authority because they are not Article III judicial officers. This
view is regularly reinforced through articles published by both judges' 3
and law professors.' 0 Because district judges are empowered to supervise the assignment of tasks to magistrates, it is perfectly proper and
understandable for district judges to limit the assignments available for
magistrates, including consent trials, if the judges possess principled
concerns about the preservation of judicial power exclusively in the
hands of Article III officials.
In addition, the magistrate judges' task assignments will continue
to be influenced by the caseload needs of their specific district courts." '
For example, because a steadily increasing number of criminal offenders are incarcerated in prisons,"' there may be a concomitant increase
in the number of habeas corpus petitions and civil rights actions filed
by prisoners.'" Although they formally possess broad judicial author139. See Richard A. Posner, Coping with the Caseload: A Comment on Magistrates and
Masters, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2215 (1989).
140. See Judith Resnik, The Mythic Meaning of Article III Courts, 56 U. COLO. L. REV.

581 (1985).
141. One important uncontrollable factor, namely the quantity and composition of
case filings within a district, can significantly affect the magistrates' roles. The nature
of the caseload can limit task assignments in particular ways regardless of the judges'
expectations and magistrates' aspirations for a broad role ...

• . .[Slubstantial caseloads in [specific] categories of cases can determine the magistrates' roles. For example, magistrates in districts near federal land may find their time
inevitably consumed by a steady stream of petty offense and misdemeanor cases. Depending upon the assignment system used within a district, a magistrate in a courthouse
near several prisons may be similarly occupied by habeas corpus and civil rights cases.
SMITH, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATES, supra note 7, at 140-41.
142. Federal courts receive habeas corpus petitions from inmates in both state and federal
prisons. Between 1980 and 1990, the number of prisoners incarcerated in state and federal correctional institutions increased from 329,821 to 771,243. Prisoners in 1990, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS BULLETIN 1, 1 (May 1991).
143. For example, the number of prisoners' petitions filed in the federal courts increased
from 33,765 in 1986 to 42,630 in 1990. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS 140 (1990).
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ity, magistrate judges who work in courthouses near the many increasingly overcrowded state and federal prisons may find their time absorbed by the same crushing burden of routine and repetitive prisoners'
filings."' Prisoners' cases as well as Social Security disability cases frequently consume the working lives of magistrate judges who perform in
the limited "Specialist" role. 14 5 There remains serious risks that magistrate judges will engage in routinized decision making if inundated
with such cases because "[t]he usual response to continuing caseloads
of routine, unsuccessful complaints seems to be a degree of cynicism
about all cases in that category.""4 6
VI.

CONCLUSION

When their interests were threatened by legislative proposals, the
magistrate judges reacted quickly by identifying potential allies and
lobbying strategies that might effectively influence congressional actions on court reform. As subordinate judicial officers, the magistrate
judges have limited resources for judicial lobbying. They share all judicial officers' inability to feed legislators' primary goal of reelection
through campaign contributions and constituent mobilization. In addition, they lack the political connections and personal relationships with
members of Congress that many Article III judges utilized in order to
gain appointment to judicial office. Moreover, because the Judicial
Conference is the institutionalized representative of the federal judiciary for communications with Congress, the magistrate judges do not
possess credibility and legitimacy as judicial spokespersons. As indicated by the events surrounding the development of the Judicial Improvements Act, the magistrate judges were ready and willing to employ their lobbying resources, but their legislative success stemmed
primarily from the convergence of their interests with those of Article
III judges and the Judicial Conference who opposed Biden's original
legislation because it would have interfered with district judges' autonomy. While the members of the Senate Judiciary Committee were preoccupied by their negotiations with the Judicial Conference aimed at
developing a bill that would be acceptable to both the judges and the
court reformers within Congress, the magistrate judges' allies suc144. SMITH, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATES, supra note 7, at 141. See Christopher E. Smith,
United States Magistrates and the Processing of Prisoner Litigation, 52 FED. PROBATION 13
(Dec. 1988).
145. SMITH, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATES, supra, note 7, at 131-32.
146. Smith, Assessing the Consequences, supra note 17, at 485.
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ceeded in adding specific provisions to the bill that advanced the
subordinate officials' goals for attaining greater status and authority.
The magistrate judges constitute a separate, self-interested group
within the judicial branch with specific interests that have often been
separate from those of Article III judicial officers.14 The magistrate
judges' efforts to gain expanded status and authority during the first
two decades of their existence led to clashes with Article III judges
who believed that the judicial subordinates should have limited authority. The magistrate judges' behavior as a judicial interest group was
predictable because of their shared goals. Despite the predictable basis
for their collective interests and judicial lobbying, the consequences of
the magistrate judges' behavior for the judicial branch may appear to
be detrimental or "dysfunction[al] [because] [i]nterest group thinking
and behavior can exacerbate conflicts" within the judiciary. 1 8 However, in light of the magistrate judges' coordinated efforts with the Judicial Conference concerning the Judicial Improvements Act, the subordinates' self-interested tactics may actually have beneficial
consequences for the judicial system. The expansion of magistrate
judges' status and authority has increased the flexibility and extent of
the judiciary's case-processing resources in an era of increasing
caseload demands upon the federal courts. The possibility of more consent trials, in particular, creates new opportunities for the federal
courts to process more civil cases during an era in which district judges
are increasingly burdened by high-priority criminal cases. Moreover,
as the magistrate judges come closer to Article III judges in terms of
status, authority, and benefits, they increase the likelihood that the interests of all federal judicial officers will converge when court reform
issues arise. Some judges who possess principled objections to the exer147. "The magistrates' formation of an active interest group is understandable in terms of
their shared interests and collective disappointment in regard to expectations about status, authority, and material benefits. The activities of such a group, however, can generate problems within
the judicial system." SMITH, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATES, supra note 7, at 168-69.
148. SMITH, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATES, supra note 7, at 168-69.
149. [Tlhe 1974 Speedy Trial Act and 1979 Speedy Trial Act amendments set time
limits for processing criminal cases. [18 U.S.C. § 3161] Thus criminal trials must frequently leap ahead of other cases on the district judges' trial dockets. As a result, civil
trials can be delayed indefinitely if a judge gets several criminal cases. This extra pressure on judges can make magistrates particularly attractive as a resource for processing
civil cases. Litigants may recognize that because magistrates' time is not absorbed by
felony cases, definite dates for civil trials may be secured by consenting to have cases
heard by these subordinate judicial officers.
Id. at 25.
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cise of judicial authority by non-Article III subordinates will continue
to resist and oppose the gains achieved by the magistrate judges. However, the net effect of the subordinates' lobbying efforts and of the convergence of their interests with those of Article III judges may be to
increase the integration, acceptance, and, hence, effectiveness of the
magistrate judges within the federal court system.

